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Knowledge Development Approaches and Breakthrough
Innovations in Technology-Based New Firms*
Dzidziso Samuel Kamuriwo, Charles Baden-Fuller, and Jing Zhang
Compared to large established firms, technology-based new firms (TBNF) seem well placed to produce break-
through innovations although questions remain as to their adeptness at subsequent exploitation. Building on the
innovation and strategy literatures, the study identifies two different knowledge-development approaches or modes
(business models) in TBNFs—internal versus external—and examines their relation to breakthrough innovation
and subsequent progression of the product to market. The internal mode assembles knowledge inside the firm to
generate its innovations, whereas the external mode relies heavily on alliances to develop and assemble knowl-
edge among firms embedded in a creative network. The study uses a unique panel dataset of 69 UK new biotech-
nology firms over an 11-year period to explore this issue empirically. The findings show that the external
knowledge-development mode is associated with more breakthrough innovations and a faster movement of innova-
tions to market. The externally focused mode is not impeded by its relative lack of internal knowledge; it uses
partners to access, assemble, and develop a wide scope of knowledge in a flexible manner. In addition, partners
provide deep domain expertise to undertake the requisite deep-dives. In contrast, the internal mode has the huge
challenge of assembling knowledge resources internally and suffers from a quicker onset of path dependence that
impedes the generation of breakthroughs. This study provides a choice of business models (internal or external)
that is associated with different breakthrough and speed to market performance outcomes. Going forward, policy
makers and managers seeking breakthrough innovations, and speedy progression of the innovations to market
should consider the potential resource efficiency of the external mode and the vital role played by collabora-
tions—small firm versus large firm and private versus public entities.
Practitioner Points
 In organizing for breakthrough innovation, firms are
faced with a choice between external or internal
knowledge-development approaches
 The external mode is better at achieving break-
throughs as well as speedily progressing products
under development to market
 The advantages of the external mode are resource
efficiency and flexible access to knowledge of
partners
 The internal mode’s performance is hampered by its




s noted by Colombo, Rossi-Lamastra,
Stephan, and van Krogh (2015), large, estab-
lished incumbent firms confront severe
obstacles when engaging in the development of break-
through innovations (Christensen, 1997; Henderson,
1993). This means smaller and newer firms are expected
to fill the gap. There is a particular group of small firms
that hold special interest—technology-based new firms
(TBNFs)—that are found in many locations, including
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TBNFs should be well placed to produce breakthrough
innovations because they are relatively more creative and
free from the inertia and myopia of their larger counter-
parts (e.g., Schneider and Veugelers, 2010). Yet, organiz-
ing for breakthrough in dynamic markets, such as in
biotechnology, is challenging for TBNFs because it
requires deep domain expertise to undertake deep-dives
and to assemble and develop a wide scope of knowl-
edge—usually from disparate sources (e.g., Kaplan and
Vakili, 2015; Phene, Fladmoe-Lindquist, and Marsh,
2006). To handle all the necessary development required
for breakthrough, TBNFs look to re-combinations of inter-
nally and externally sourced knowledge (e.g., Carayanno-
poulos, 2009; Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996).
Even though all TBNFS use alliances to source
external knowledge, what is not clearly understood is
whether in organizing for breakthrough TBNFs should
focus their creativity more toward internal or external
knowledge. The second question that is unclear is
which organizing approach, given the resource mobili-
zation challenge that underpins each organizing
approach, allows TBNFs that successfully produce
breakthrough innovations to also progress products
faster toward the market. This question arises from the
tension highlighted by March (1991), that successful
exploration in generating breakthrough innovations
may be far removed from successful exploitation, i.e.,
bringing products to market quickly.
Grant (1996) and Grant and Baden-Fuller (2004) note
that there are two fundamentally different “knowledge-
development approaches or modes” among firms that are
involved in alliances. These modes differ in terms of
their loci of creativity and the way knowledge is assem-
bled and, hence, are likely to yield quite different knowl-
edge outcomes. For the case of TBNFs, the first
organizational approach that we label “internal mode”
involves efficient knowledge integration by organizing
multidisciplinary R&D capabilities within the boundaries
of the firm under hierarchical control, deemed to save
coordination costs and limit expropriation concerns (e.g.,
Cassiman, Di Guardo, and Valentini, 2005; Chesbrough
and Teece, 1996; Grant, 1996; Spithoven, Frantzen, and
Clarysse, 2010). Despite its small size and relative new-
ness, a TBNF can successfully adopt this mode focusing
on internal R&D, supplemented where necessary by
external knowledge typically gained in alliances.
In contrast, the other less-explored “external mode”
avoids large commitments to in-house R&D and in-
house laboratories. Instead, the firm engages external
partners for almost all development work, including
both the assembly of knowledge and its development,
and it uses creative organizational arrangements to
mitigate the anticipated high transaction costs and risks
of loss of control (e.g., Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004;
Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller, 1995). The external
mode, typically labeled virtual or hollow, requires a
rich network of partners that hold and develop the nec-
essary knowledge. The existing literature on innova-
tion has tended to down-play the importance of this
second approach––citing issues of opportunism and
coordination costs (see for instance Cassiman et al.,
2005; Chesbrough and Teece, 1996)—yet for the
TBNFs seeking nonstandard outcomes such as speedy
breakthrough innovation, the knowledge access
approach may be very attractive because of the lower
commitment, greater flexibility, and the possibility of
accessing knowledge over a wider domain.
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In the theory development section, hypotheses
are formally developed relating the two modes of
organizing knowledge to breakthrough innovation and
subsequent exploitation in product development. Using
the knowledge-development and innovation literatures,
the paper looks at how each mode influences the way
in which key prerequisites for breakthrough innova-
tion, i.e., the assembly of distant and diverse knowl-
edge and the undertaking of deep-dives (e.g., Kaplan
and Vakili, 2015; Phene et al., 2006), are organized.
Even though TBNFs are generally considered rela-
tively flexible (e.g., Schneider and Veugelers, 2010),
the relatively quicker onset of path dependency in the
internally focused mode as the TBNF grows presents
problems that may limit the possibilities of break-
through innovation and fast product development (e.g.,
Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Ghemawat and del Sol,
1998; McGrath and MacMillan, 2000; Padgett and
Powell, 2003; Puranam, Singh, and Zollo, 2003; Roth-
aermel and Deeds, 2006). The paper suggests that the
external development mode will be more successful at
breakthrough innovation and the related product devel-
opment because the richer network arrangement is
associated with flexibility and “option-like” character-
istics, which allow the TBNF to probe the unexpected
without the extensive commitments and path depen-
dency associated with the internal development mode
(McGrath and MacMillan, 2000).
The setting of new drug development in biotechnol-
ogy is used to explore the validity of our theorizing.
The unique dataset includes 69 UK biotechnology
firms’ knowledge-development modes and product
innovation over an 11-year period from 1995 to 2005.
The empirical work supports the theoretical proposi-
tions. The findings are that after controlling for impor-
tant environmental factors, particularly funding levels,
the externally focused development mode is associated
with superior breakthrough outcomes and related prod-
uct development.
It is revealing to selectively compare two quite
well-known firms in the database: Arrow (a firm with
an internal knowledge mode) and Alizyme (a firm
with an external knowledge mode), both of which
were carefully interviewed by the first author. Arrow
was founded around 1998 and raised approximately
£40 million by the end of 2005. It engaged in ten alli-
ance partnerships, seven of which took place in the
first two years of its life. Adopting an internal knowl-
edge-development mode, Arrow integrated alliance
partners’ knowledge into its own laboratories. Its
achievements by the end of 2005 include two U.S.
patents, one project passing Phase I clinical trials, and
several others in the pipeline. However, none of
Arrow’s patents can be considered a “breakthrough.”
In contrast, Alizyme, founded in 1997, raised £59 mil-
lion by the end of 2005 and never built a lab and did
not employ “wet bench” scientists but engaged in 18
alliances. Alizyme won six U.S. patents (from work
that was subcontracted to partner firms), and one of
these patents was a “breakthrough” (a potential block-
buster anti-obesity drug). Additionally, Alizyme had
projects passing Phase I clinical trials faster than
Arrow. Founded at similar times, with similar levels of
funding, Arrow (internal mode) was less productive
compared to Alizyme, as Arrow, in particular, did not
achieve any breakthrough patents.1
This study extends the strategy perspective of inno-
vation management by identifying how two different
knowledge-development approaches that can be
adopted by TBNFs influence breakthrough innovation
and subsequent product development.
Theoretical Framework
The topic of this special issue is breakthrough innova-
tions, defined as high-impact innovations (Conti, Gam-
bardella, and Mariani, 2014; Kaplan and Vakili, 2015;
Phene et al., 2006) or products “that create entirely
new markets or radically change existing ones”
(Colombo et al., 2015). It is typically argued that pro-
ducing breakthrough innovation involves re-
combination of distant and diverse knowledge bases
(e.g., Cassiman et al., 2005; Kaplan and Vakili, 2015)
and the ability to explore complex issues with a deep-
dive into a specific arena (e.g., Padgett and Powell,
2003; Weisberg, 1999). Below, the features of external
and internal knowledge-development modes are first
articulated, particularly how the modes organize the
assembly and subsequent development of knowledge
for breakthrough innovation. Then, the hypotheses on
how the knowledge-development modes relate to
breakthrough innovation and product development rate
will be presented.
External Development Mode
The externally focused knowledge-development mode
is associated with more virtual organizations (Ches-
brough and Teece, 1996), network organizations (e.g.,
1Neither firm exists today—their patent portfolios have been absorbed into other
firms.
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Miles and Snow, 1986) or modular organizations (San-
chez and Mahoney, 1996). The knowledge base of the
firm lies mainly outside its boundaries, with the found-
ers and top management team holding a complemen-
tary base of expertise. In the case of TBNFs, their
teams typically include star scientists with managerial
experience drawn from within the biopharmaceutical
industry (e.g., Powell and Sandholtz, 2012). The exter-
nal mode firm, through its founders and managers,
plays an integrative role in a network of partners orga-
nized to assemble and develop knowledge. The focal
firm role involves raising money, helping with the
design of studies in collaboration with partners (but
not having wet bench scientists), in-licensing of IP for
further development, developing the network by
recruiting partners (e.g., providing leadership that
includes getting buy-in on the innovation concepts
from potential partners, making use of industry con-
tacts and experience in recruiting partners) and manag-
ing the network (i.e., providing an overall governance
structure and coordination to facilitate knowledge shar-
ing and development and, finally, project managing
the product development process from stage to stage),
(Kamuriwo and Baden-Fuller, 2016).
Why should partner firms cooperate and engage in
such knowledge assembly? Why should they engage in
the deep-dives required for innovation and give up the
intellectual property (IP) rights to the final product?
Partner firms are specialist firms that provide either
specialist or complex services that are usually for only
a segment of the value chain. For example, the biotech
value chain is lengthy and has distinct product devel-
opment stages. Partners are recruited to provide spe-
cialist services, such as chemistry services providers or
specialist testing laboratories. Other partner firms pro-
vide more-complex services, which may cover a dis-
tinct value chain stage (Kamuriwo and Baden-Fuller,
2016). The motivation to participate goes far beyond
cash or future option payments. Some partners are
motivated by being part of a much more valuable net-
work of firms in which the focal firm can add value
by communicating and transferring knowledge gained
across the network (e.g., Nambisan and Sawhney,
2011; Kamuriwo and Baden-Fuller, 2016). Large
incumbents have knowledge already assembled for
another purpose—where the knowledge is not being
fully utilized or is quite complementary to that of the
focal firm. Thus, large incumbent firms may perceive
partnering with TBNFs as a highly profitable use of
already assembled knowledge as well as an opportu-
nity to learn new things by participating with others
that have different perspectives on challenging issues
(Lipparini, Lorenzoni, and Ferriani, 2014; Lorenzoni
and Baden-Fuller, 1995).
The process by which the focal firm assembles
knowledge is quite different from its internally focused
counterparts. It assimilates, or “accommodates” in the
terminology used by Todorova and Durisin (2007),
knowledge through external mechanisms with no pri-
mary intention to integrate external knowledge inter-
nally (e.g., Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004). These
processes involve network development that avails rel-
evant diverse knowledge to the focal firm for product
development (e.g., Chakma, Calcagno, Behbahani, and
Mojtahedian, 2009; Nambisan and Sawhney, 2011).
In making the above points, we recognize that many
have criticized the capacity of virtual arrangements to
achieve success in any dimension. The criticisms relate
to many issues, such as interfirm transaction costs and
risk of loss of control (e.g., Chesbrough and Teece,
1996), opportunistic risk and other transaction costs asso-
ciated with arm’s-length contracting (Hagedoorn and
Narula, 1996), entrepreneurs underestimating the diffi-
culty of running the external mode (Gulati and Kletter,
2005), and externally oriented firms being overtaken by
their competitors (Askenazy, Thesmar, and Thoenig,
2006). These concerns may be overestimated because
the well-organized externally oriented firm develops
defense mechanisms to minimize such risks. These
mechanisms may include owning the specific intellectual
property rights (IPR) on the innovations they purchase
and ensuring that the large firms gain from the transac-
tion to leave them satisfied (e.g., Katila, Rosenberger,
and Eisenhardt, 2008). To fully appreciate the external
mode, it is valuable to explicate the alternative approach.
Internal Development Mode
The internal development mode is typically associated
with large incumbents and, in this context, with
smaller and newer firms that closely follow the struc-
tures and processes of large firms. It involves assem-
bling, exploring, and exploiting knowledge within the
boundaries of the firm to ensure efficient management
of dense transactional knowledge flows and cross-
domain linkages normally associated with deep-dives
required in breakthrough innovation (e.g., Brusoni and
Prencipe, 2011; Padgett and Powell, 2003). It also
involves developing routines for evaluating, acquiring,
and exploiting external knowledge that fills knowledge
gaps—a process called absorptive capacity (e.g.,
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Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). The basic premise of an
internally focused mode is that the firm develops deep
domain expertise and engages in the necessary deep-
dives and knowledge integration activities that produce
breakthroughs (cf. Pammolli, Magazzini, and Ricca-
boni, 2011; Weisberg, 1999). In this context, the firm
needs a set of “higher-level organizing principles” and
a conducive social context to support its knowledge
management activities (Grant, 1996; Kogut and Zan-
der, 1996). These principles outline what has to be
done and, importantly, smooth away internal impedi-
ments (such as haggling and turf wars) through fiat-
based mechanisms (e.g., Conner and Prahalad, 1996).
The principles that underlie these outcomes are a
strong commitment to assembling diverse knowledge
internally (perhaps with alliances), exploring that
knowledge (with deep-dives) and then exploiting that
knowledge (e.g., Weisberg, 1999). A firm requires
deep domain knowledge to understand the foundational
assumptions of knowledge domains, and this knowl-
edge includes knowledge of weaknesses that may need
to be overcome to achieve breakthrough innovations
(Taylor and Greve, 2006).
However, there is an important additional issue that
arises where knowledge covers a wide terrain and where
that knowledge within these different spheres evolves at
different speeds. In such cases, the firm has to make
choices about which knowledge to assemble and where to
take the deep-dives, and these choices may give rise to
path dependency, shutting out some possibilities but
increasing others. This onset of path dependency (focus)
has potential negative effects for achieving breakthrough
innovation because it tends to move the firm forward
based on the refinement of relatively well-known paths
(Sørensen and Stuart, 2000) or on the basis of making use
of well-known heuristics (Chase and Simon, 1973), all of
which reduces the likelihood of using “outside the box
approaches.” In addition, the small TBNF following this
internal mode can be seriously challenged to assemble the
necessary knowledge to innovate—it may take time and
money to assemble the knowledge and build the relevant
processes (e.g., Powell et al., 1996; Sapienza, Autio,
George, and Zahra, 2006). Only those TBNFs that wisely
choose their knowledge terrain can be successful.
Knowledge Development Modes and Breakthrough
Innovations
As noted above, the internal mode of knowledge-devel-
opment encourages dense transactional knowledge flows
and cross-domain linkages that aid breakthrough inno-
vation (e.g., Brusoni and Prencipe, 2011; Padgett and
Powell, 2003). However, the internally focused knowl-
edge-development mode commits early to a technology
approach and limits future search breadth. This commit-
ment leads to path dependency, which is reflected in
the subsequent development of knowledge-sharing pro-
cesses, routines, shared communication codes, and cul-
ture (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). All of these factors
make the internally focused business model relatively
less flexible (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Zahra and George,
2002). Put another way, the internal mode is likely to
be associated with a narrow scope, fixed purpose, and
limited search that makes the firm’s knowledge base
“sticky” and its direction difficult to reverse. Thus,
although the internal mode may create breakthrough
innovation in its chosen path, it has a relatively limited
capacity to achieve the necessary variation to support a
number of breakthrough innovations, especially in fast-
moving markets.
In contrast, the externally focused knowledge
development mode has more flexibility than the inter-
nal mode because, for example, the firm’s value chain
activities or its components can be more easily disen-
gaged or recombined in different ways to react to dif-
ferent opportunities (Schilling and Steensma, 2001).
This means that the external mode can generate more
options that allow the search to range over a far
wider area (Grant, 1996; McGrath and MacMillan,
2000) and is less likely to suffer from the onset of
core rigidities than the internal mode (Leonard-Bar-
ton, 1992). Therefore, firms with the external mode
will retain a greater willingness and ability to act on
new knowledge. With the external mode, it is not the
firm but the partner who provides the majority of the
resources (including the absorptive capacity; Cohen
and Levinthal, 1990). Thus, although the focal firm
shows a relative lack of commitment, the amount of
resources in the whole system may be higher than
that in the internal mode, giving rise to more break-
through innovations (Lipparini et al., 2014; Lorenzoni
and Baden-Fuller, 1995).
As noted above, it is not sufficient to merely note
the possibility of combinations—the firm has to
engage in deep-dives to make the combinations hap-
pen. Here, the externally organized firm is challenged
because the deep-dives often have to be undertaken by
partners. However, this is possible. The history of
ARM, the UK microchip design company that has
won more than 90% of the world’s mobile phone mar-
ket through external knowledge development, is an
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illustration of just these points. It has used its partners
to search over a wide domain, and it has used its part-
ners to deep-dive and make the new combinations
work. O’Keeffe and Williamson (2002) and subsequent
shareholder presentations and annual reports document
some of the processes adopted by ARM, as well as
how the firm achieved a series of breakthrough
innovations.
H1: Other things being equal, the externally
focused knowledge development mode will achieve
more breakthrough innovations than the internally
focused mode.
Knowledge Development Modes and Product
Development
When considering the organizational arrangements that
favor breakthrough innovations, it is also necessary to con-
sider the issue of timely and prompt exploitation. Society
as a whole, and investors in particular, are impatient. It
was March (1991) who pointed out that tensions between
effective exploration and timely exploitation can often
hinder firm success; and it was Teece (1986) who empha-
sized that firms that engage in the greatest breakthrough
innovation are challenged to exploit those benefits in a
timely manner, citing examples of 19th century innovators
such as Eli Whitney dying in penury before he could reap
the benefits of his highly successful cotton-gin invention.
Carayannopoulos (2009), among others, explains that the
chances of successful exploitation of breakthrough innova-
tions are strongly influenced by whether innovation chal-
lenges the industry assumptions about architecture and
modularity, with far greater chances of success for those
that are not challenging the status quo on many dimen-
sions. The context here, like so many, is one where break-
throughs are radical but do not necessarily require changes
in the industry’s architecture. Regulatory constraints force
all drug development firms, no matter how groundbreak-
ing the drug, to yield to clinical testing and use established
channels of distribution. Yet, there is still a gap between
the breakthrough innovation (typically represented by a
successful patent) and ultimate success—which can only
be bridged if the firm puts its innovation into a product
that can be launched in the market. In the context of this
paper, it is therefore possible that one mode of knowledge
development may favor developing an innovation but be
paradoxically less effective at putting innovations on the
market.
The two modes of organizing—external and inter-
nal knowledge development—have different implica-
tions for how (scarce) resources are allocated toward
progressing products under development to market
(e.g., Conti et al., 2014). The internal mode is associ-
ated with a large firm mentality and relatively slow
internal knowledge sharing. Typically attributed to
functional silos, these barriers keep the R&D laborato-
ries separated from business development units (Tsai,
2002).
In contrast, a TBNF that adopts the external model
is likely to move faster, because the external mode is
based on quick and flexible access to relevant distant
or diverse external knowledge in specialized partners
or large established organizations. The functional silo
issue is also much less evident in the external mode.
Moreover, while having diverse domains in-house may
be good for creative tension, it may also create serious
problems such as divergent objectives, domains com-
peting for organizational resources, and high coordina-
tion costs across domains (Lerner and Merges, 1998).
The strategic logic of the externally focused knowl-
edge development mode also allows for quick access to
new resources or new knowledge, particularly in fast-
paced environments (Kamuriwo and Baden-Fuller,
2016; Volberda, 1996). Just as the internally focused
knowledge development mode is associated with earlier
commitment, the external mode offers flexibility that is
associated with keeping choices open and thus affords
strategic flexibility or speed to change course, a style
that is associated with flexible options (McGrath, 1999;
McGrath and MacMillan, 2000, esp. chapter 11).
Hence, adopting a virtual business model, firms with
the external mode become more reactive and sensitive
to customer needs, and they will achieve faster product
innovation compared to firms with the internal mode.
H2: Other things being equal, for firms that have
achieved breakthrough innovations, the externally
focused knowledge development mode will be
associated with a higher product development rate
than the internally focused mode.
Methodology
Research Setting, Data, and Sample
The biotechnology sector is associated with break-
through innovations (Lazonick and Tulum, 2011).
Novelty is the objective of all drug development R&D
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programs because new molecules (drugs) cannot be
patented, tested, and then licensed unless they can be
shown to be novel to both patent examiners and regu-
lators. However, not all drugs are breakthrough
drugs—many merely fill gaps.
This study focuses on TBNFs located in the UK,
where biotech is thriving and the two knowledge-
development modes are prevalent. The UK leads
Europe in biotech development and holds a significant
place in the world (Owen-Smith, Riccaboni, Pammolli,
and Powell, 2002). In the UK, there is plentiful data
on TBNFs because of public disclosure laws (unlike
the United States, where it is very difficult to obtain
data on TBNFs that are not publicly listed because pri-
vate firms are not required to disclose their financial
and organizational characteristics). Despite its pecu-
liarities, this context is economically and socially
important in its own right, and it has features that are
highly relevant to other contexts—it takes knowledge
from well-established domains and develops new
knowledge by a process of search, deep-dives, and
recombination that produces results that clearly change
the world.
All UK biotechnology firms founded between 1995
and 2005 were identified. The data were multi-sourced
from directories of the UK Government DTI Bioscience
unit; the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO); the British Venture Capital Association;
regional life sciences networking groups; and commer-
cial databases such as BIO Century, VentureXpert, and
FAME that are verified with the UK companies’ regis-
tration office database at Companies House. In line
with past research (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004), this
study focused on those companies that are involved in
the research, development, and commercialization of
human therapeutics that are placed in the human body
(in vivo) and not those that are used outside the human
body (in vitro therapeutics). This means the study
excluded companies that were involved in other bio-
technology application segments such as specialist prod-
uct or service suppliers, diagnostics, tissue engineering,
drug delivery, medical engineering, and agro-based bio-
technology companies.
From this initial set of 120 companies, each firm’s
history was traced and we collected data for each year
of observation from founding until 2005 or when the
firm either ceased to exist or was acquired, whichever
came first. Those firms that are subsidiaries of estab-
lished firms or of foreign origin were excluded. After
dropping companies because of lack of data, the final
sample consisted of 69 firms.
Measures
Dependent variables. The first dependent variable
measures the number of the firm’s patents that turned
out to be a breakthrough innovation in the three-year
window by year t. It takes two steps to calculate this
variable. First, the potential influence or importance of
the firm’s inventions in year t was measured. It is
widely agreed in the literature that potential influence
can be measured by the net forward cites of a firm’s
patents (e.g., Kaplan and Vakili, 2015; Phene et al.,
2006; Trajtenberg, 1990). This was measured by first
identifying a firm’s original patents at year t and then
computing for each patent the total number of forward
citations (excluding self-citations) in the ten-year win-
dow from the date of application. Because the data-
base ended in 2005, all patents had an equal ten-year
window of observations.
In the second step, the total number of break-
through innovations a firm has achieved in the three-
year window by year t were identified and counted.
Following previous writers (e.g., Kaplan and Vakili,
2015; Phene et al., 2006), the original patents of the
whole dataset were sorted according to their number
of net forward citations received and coded as a break-
through if the patents in year t received the top 5% net
forward citations. In robustness checks, breakthrough
innovations for firms receiving the top 10% of all cita-
tions were computed in a similar way. Finally, the
total number of breakthrough innovations in a three-
year window were counted. Thus, the breakthrough
innovation for any firm in year 2000, for instance, is
the sum of the number of breakthrough innovations in
the years between 1998 and 2000. The year window
method is commonly adopted by prior studies that use
patents to measure firm innovation outcomes, as it
attenuates any annual fluctuations and thus captures a
firm’s patenting propensity more accurately (e.g.,
Ahuja, 2000; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; Zhang and
Baden-Fuller, 2010). In our robustness checks, a four-
year window was used.
The second dependent variable, product develop-
ment rate, is a time-dated hazard rate for the firm’s
first product development milestone, phase I clinical
trials. The hazard rate incorporates two pieces of infor-
mation: first, whether the firm reached the product
development milestone in year t, and second, the rate
of development (i.e., the time in months it takes from
the founding of the firm to its first product develop-
ment milestone of clinical phase I). When a biotech-
nology firm’s products in development have
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successfully entered phase I clinical trials, it signals
that the firm has effectively managed to generate and
apply knowledge, a point that is widely acknowledged
in this field (e.g., Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). Many
firms in this sector do not have commercial products
for a long time, and this measure is thus appropriate
as a measure of a key (albeit interim) milestone suc-
cess (e.g., Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). In addition,
since the focus was on whether and when the firm is
able to achieve the product development milestone for
those firms that achieve breakthrough innovations, the
sample was limited to those firms that have obtained
at least one breakthrough innovation during the
observed years and excluded firms without any break-
through innovations.
Independent variables: Knowledge development
mode. The firms’ knowledge development mode was
classified as either internally or externally focused. It
is well documented that TBNFs in biotechnology often
adopt an external mode of knowledge management
(see, for instance, Luukkonen, 2005, on vertical disin-
tegration in young Finnish biotech firms; Mangematin
et al., 2003, on French biotech firms’ knowledge tra-
jectories; and Haagen, Haussler, Harhoff, Murray, and
Rudolph, 2007, on the knowledge structures of young
UK and German biotech firms). Following the logic of
the argument, for each firm in year t, its knowledge
management mode was classified as “internally
focused” and set the value as “1” if the firm has a lab-
oratory and “wet bench” scientists to cover upstream
activities of the pharmaceutical value chain.2 On the
other end, the externally focused mode is coded as
“0,” which applies to virtual firms that do not have
R&D facilities of their own, i.e., that have no “wet
bench” scientists and rely on outsourcing for their
R&D knowledge development activities (e.g., Cavalla,
Flack, and Jennings, 1997; Chakma et al., 2009).
The data on whether a company had a laboratory
was obtained from detailed financial reports of the
firms (from Companies House), filing documents from
the stock exchange (for those firms listed on the stock
exchange), press releases, and industry and company
websites. While the coding was largely based on
objective data, to ensure the reliability of the coding,
five follow-up interviews were first conducted with the
founders of firms to verify the nature of their knowl-
edge approach and to confirm that the coding approach
made sense. Then, two of the co-authors coded the
variables separately, and the inter-rater reliability was
0.93—well above the conventional cut-off point
(Cohen and Cohen, 1983). Finally, all three authors
verified and agreed on the coding. As a result of the
coding, 56 of the 69 firms were consistent in their
knowledge approach throughout their lifetimes, and 13
switched. Of these 13, only 1 switched twice (external
to internal and then back to external). The remaining
firms switched only once, and the most common
change was for a firm to start with the external mode,
then to move to the internal mode.
Below, a few examples are provided to illustrate
how firm knowledge-development modes were classi-
fied. The first, Arrow Therapeutics Limited, was one
of the UK’s premier small biotechnology firms and
employed an internally focused knowledge develop-
ment model. Arrow developed a fully kitted laboratory
with core research capabilities in virology, microbiol-
ogy, and chemistry under the firm hierarchy. At its
peak, Arrow had 60 multidisciplinary R&D employees
out of a total of approximately 80. Arrow’s internal
research capabilities were the primary driver of its
innovation development strategy. In addition, Arrow
had complementary alliances with academic and public
research units, specialist providers, and large pharma-
ceutical companies. The second example is of a virtual
and thus externally focused knowledge development
model typified by Evolutec plc, a UK-based 1998
spin-off from a public research institution. Although
Evolutec managed to raise funds comparable to Arrow,
it had only approximately 11 employees, most of
whom were considered administrative staff. Evolutec
had no R&D facilities or any in-house “wet bench”
scientists. Employees classified as R&D staff were
project managers involved in coordinating the develop-
ment of projects in their partner network. Another
externally focused firm, Alizyme, mentioned earlier,
had 19 employees, including 14 scientists, but (con-
firmed by interview) none of these scientists were
involved as “wet bench” scientists, as there was no
laboratory. The scientists’ main duties included design-
ing R&D studies in conjunction with partner scientists
and monitoring R&D work undertaken by partners.
2The progression of drug discovery and development stages in biotechnology is
well documented (e.g., Giovannetti and Morrison, 2000; Smith, 2004; Rothaermel
and Deeds, 2004). The first stage is target identification, which largely involves
molecular biology and genomics. The next stage is lead discovery, which is an
iterative process involving chemistry and biochemistry and then a lead optimiza-
tion process that involves technologies such as high throughput screening and
combinatorial chemistry. This stage is followed by pharmaceutical development,
which involves a preclinical phase and three clinical phases of development that
look at the toxicological characteristics and involve pharmacology, chemical
development, pharmaceutics, volunteer studies, etc. Although this listing is not
meant to be exhaustive, it underlies the fact that the process is multidisciplinary,
sequential, and systemic, i.e., there are feedback loops between the distinct
activities.
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Controls. Past research has highlighted the impor-
tance of several control variables that may impact suc-
cessful firm innovation. Except where indicated, all
controls were time varying.
The most important control is money raised by the
firm, which we expect to have a positive influence on
innovation outcomes. The variable funds measures the
cumulative amount of funds raised since the firm’s
founding by year t, measured in £ sterling. This mea-
sure indicates the amount of funds the firm is able to
commit to R&D programs both inside and outside the
firm’s boundaries, and it signals capacity to innovate
(e.g., Sørensen and Stuart, 2000). The natural loga-
rithm of funds was used in data analysis due to the
skewed distribution of the variable.
VC backing is included to capture whether a firm
was financed by venture capital firms (VCs) in any
particular year, expecting this control to be positively
related to innovation outcomes (e.g., Rothaermel and
Deeds, 2004). Approximately 60% of our sample had
such backing. VCs, as specialist investors attempting
to achieve consistently high returns, can have a sub-
stantial influence on a TBNF’s knowledge building tra-
jectory and strategy and can encourage focus and
effective outcomes through the execution of a fast
growth strategy (Haagen et al., 2007).
A binary variable, listing, was included that takes
the value 1 if a firm was listed on a public stock
exchange in year t. Public exchanges are a real alterna-
tive for funding small firms that may not want to go the
VC route (e.g., Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). Only a
small number of sample firms achieved listing during
the time of our research. Public listing could positively
influence a firm’s attitude toward breakthrough innova-
tion (see, for instance, Owen and Hopkins, 2016).
The total number of employees was used as a proxy
for firm size. Past researchers in the biotech field
make the point that larger firms are more likely to be
effective at innovation. Although firm size is often
measured in revenues or market share, most biotech
firms do not have significant revenue streams in their
early stages, thus making the measure inappropriate in
this sector (Shan, Walker, and Kogut, 1994). We use
the natural logarithm of employees in data analysis
because of the skewed distribution of the variable.
The number of alliances the firm is involved in at
year t are used as a control. Alliances are a key source
of resources for the focal firm, and many researchers
argue that alliances improve innovative performance
(e.g., Baum, Calabrese, and Silverman, 2000).
A time invariant dummy, technology type, was
included to indicate whether a firm’s technology is
based on small molecule technology or any other type,
such as large molecule biologics. This measure was
used to control for the fact that different technologies
may have different levels of difficulty that may affect
innovative outcomes.
Finally, therapeutic categories were included, mea-
sured by the number of customer segments in which
the company has active research projects. The informa-
tion is reported in Bio Century (e.g., Hoang and
Rothaermel, 2010). The measure denotes a firm’s par-
ticipation in different product-market applications. A
biotech firm can be involved in multiproduct innovation
projects whereby each project is classified in terms of a
major therapeutic area that is perhaps more likely to
produce breakthrough innovations (but subject to a
given level of funding, size, and other control factors)
but is less likely to produce a good product-develop-
ment rate. A given level of the TBNF’s resources is
spread over more projects (e.g., Hoang and Rothaermel,
2010). Table 1 summarizes the variables and their
measurements.
Estimation Procedure
The dataset is an unbalanced 11-year panel consisting
of 370 firm-year observations for the 69 firms in our
sample. As noted before, only 13 of the 69 firms have
ever changed the knowledge development mode during
the 11 years, among which 12 firms only changed
once. Therefore, random-effects models were used in
the data analysis. This is because the aim is not to
understand why a firm might switch its knowledge
mode but rather what are the effects of the mode.
Fixed-effects models should be applied only when the
research seeks to analyze the impact of variables that
vary over time (Baltagi, 2008).
To test H1, negative binomial regressions were
modeled because the dependent variable is the count
of breakthrough innovations, and its distribution is
skewed (Phene et al., 2006). To test H2, where the
dependent variable combines the probability of and the
time to an event, i.e., the first key product develop-
ment milestone, Cox propositional hazard models were
employed to perform the event history analysis (e.g.,
Cox, 1972). The results of Cox models can be inter-
preted as follows: “a positive (negative) coefficient
sign would indicate a greater (lower) hazard of the
focal event occurring. Hence, the variable of interest
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leads to a faster (slower) occurrence of the focal event.
Higher (lower) hazard rates, in turn, suggest a larger
(smaller) number of such events within a given time
period” (Hoang and Rothaermel, 2010, p. 745).
Results
Descriptive Analysis
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics and the cor-
relations between variables. To check for potential
problems with collinearity, the variance inflation fac-
tors (VIFs) were estimated, and they were well below
the recommended limit of 10 (e.g., Stevens, 1992).
The relationships between these variables will be
examined more thoroughly in the regression model
analysis that follows.
The average age of the sample firms was approxi-
mately 5 years, and they had raised an average of
approximately £13 million. Just over 50% of these
firms had the internally focused knowledge develop-
ment mode, and most obtained funding from VCs. On
average, all sample firms sourced knowledge from
approximately seven external partners, participated in
two therapeutic categories, employed 25 employees,
and were granted approximately three to four patents.




Breakthrough invention Number of breakthrough patents in 3-year window by year t. Breakthrough patents are
defined as the top 5% patents ranked by total net patent citations each patent received in
a 10-year window from application date. Robustness checks use the top 2% and 10%
definitions and a 4-year window.
Yes
Product development rate Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if and when a firm first announces a product is in
clinical phase I trials
Yes
Time (month) The number of months when a product reaches the clinical phase I trials Yes
Knowledge development
mode
Dummy that takes a value of 1 for internal mode, that is, if the firm has a laboratory and
employs “wet bench scientists” and zero for the external mode
Rarelya
Listing Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if and when the firm is publicly listed Rarelyb
VC backing Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if and when the firm is venture capital backed and
zero otherwise
Rarelyb
Ln (funds) Cumulative funds raised by firm in any given year Yes
Ln (employees) Total number of employees in firm Yes
Alliances Number of alliances announced by firm in year Yes
Therapeutic categories Number of therapeutic categories the firm is reported to engage in as reported by Bio
Century
No
Technology type Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm R&D program involves small molecules
and zero otherwise
No
a56 of the 69 firms were consistent in their knowledge approach throughout their lifetimes, and 13 switched. Of these 13, only 1 switched twice
(external to internal and then back to external). The remaining firms switched only once.
bA firm’s listing or VC backing status will take the value “0” until it went public or received VC funds. After that, the status will take the value “1.”
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlation Matrix
Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 Breakthrough innovation 0.19 0.39 0 1 1.00
2 Knowledge develop. mode 0.61 0.49 0 1 0.15 1.00
3 Product development rate 0.23 0.42 0 1 0.18 0.09 1.00
4 Time (months) 47.93 27.95 1 129 0.27 0.24 0.49 1.00
5 Listing 0.08 0.27 0 1 0.32 20.04 0.35 0.31 1.00
6 VC backing 0.63 0.48 0 1 0.00 0.12 0.01 0.12 20.14 1.00
7 Ln (funds) 1.54 1.78 23.00 4.45 0.34 0.50 0.48 0.62 0.26 0.24 1.00
8 Ln (employees) 2.34 1.25 0 4.70 0.29 0.71 0.37 0.53 0.14 0.11 0.80 1.00
9 Alliances 1.32 2.47 0 41 20.09 20.01 20.09 20.09 0.03 0.03 20.01 0.04 1.00
10 Therapeutic categories 1.95 0.99 1 5 20.11 20.10 0.06 0.04 0.09 20.01 0.15 0.04 0.13 1.00
11 Technology type 0.66 0.47 0 1 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.12 0.22 0.14 0.07 0.13
p< .05 when coefficient is larger than 0.10.
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These results are comparable to those obtained in other
management studies in the biotech sector (Mangematin
et al., 2003; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004).
Hypotheses tests. Tables 3 and 4 report the results
of testing H1 and H2, respectively. H1 predicts that
the external knowledge mode is associated with more
breakthrough innovation. A negative binomial regres-
sion is employed. Model 1 in Table 3 is the baseline
model with all control variables, and the variable
knowledge development mode is introduced in model
2. The results in model 2 show that the firms with the
externally focused knowledge-development mode are
associated with more breakthrough innovation outputs
(b520.784, p< .10). The effect size of the knowl-
edge development mode was calculated. The result
suggests that the internal mode is associated with
45.7% as many breakthrough innovations as the exter-
nal mode, i.e., is 54.3% less productive, holding all
other variables in the model constant. Overall, H1 is
supported.
H2 suggests that, compared to those with the inter-
nally focused knowledge development mode, firms
with the external mode will be associated with a
higher rate of achieving the milestone that the first
product goes under development in phase I clinical tri-
als; and the sample is restricted to those firms that
achieve a breakthrough innovation. To test this
hypothesis, Cox propositional hazards models were
applied. Model 2 in Table 4 shows that the firms with
the internal mode are significantly and negatively asso-
ciated with achieving the product development mile-
stone (b523.854, p< .05). Again, the effect size of
the knowledge-development mode was checked. Using
a 95% confidence interval, the lower bound hazard
ratio is 0.129 for the variable, which suggests that
adopting the externally focused knowledge-develop-
ment mode will increase the probability of achieving
the product innovation milestone and that a firm that
has not yet achieved a milestone by a certain time has
at least 7.7 times (51/0.129) more chance to achieve a
milestone at the next point in time compared to firms
with an internally focused mode. All results lend sup-
port to H2.
Robustness checks. A number of robustness tests on
H1 were conducted. First, the effect of eliminating
ln(funds) in the data analysis was examined, since this
control variable is highly correlated with another con-
trol variable ln(employees) (b5 0.80). Second, a four-
Table 3. Effects of the Knowledge-Development Modes on the Number of Breakthrough Innovation (H1)







Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Listing 1.097** 0.937 1.062* 1.135*** 0.500
(0.487) (0.555) (0.448) (0.352) (0.307)
VC backing 0.959** 1.034** 0.804 1.075*** 20.143
(0.480) (0.474) (0.406)* (0.361) (0.270)
Ln (funds) 0.938*** 0.828*** 0.824*** 0.299
(0.226) (0.222) (0.196) (0.174)
Ln (employees) 0.237 0.533*** 1.149** 0.520*** 0.577**
(0.170) (0.206) (0.202) (0.193) (0.225)
Alliances 20.138 20.156 20.200* 20.189** 20.204**
(0.085) (0.089) (0.096) (0.087) (0.090)
Therapeutic categories 20.294 20.346 20.301 20.316 20.192
(0.173) (0.188) (0.178) (0.161) (0.112)
Technology type 0.389 0.353 0.269 0.418 0.109
(0.354) (0.356) (0.317) (0.298) (0.267)
Knowledge development mode 20.784* 21.147** 20.596* 20.553*
(external50; internal51) (0.459) (0.484) (0.369) (0.308)
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included
Constant 216.083 216.928 218.277 213.212 214.487
N 373 373 391 373 373
Log pseudo likelihood 2114.69 2113.68 2131.35 2142.47 2208.11
Pseudo R2 0.3558 0.3614 0.3022 0.3491 0.2103
Coefficients are reported, and standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p< .01, ** p< .05, * p< .1.
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year window was adopted to replace the three-year window
when counting the number of breakthrough innovations.
Third, the top 5% of patent citations were substituted by
10% when defining a breakthrough innovation. The effect
of the knowledge mode variable remained, as shown in
Table 3 Models 3–5 respectively. Hence, the result on the
H1 test is robust to a satisfactory level.
A number of robustness tests on H2 were also con-
ducted. For similar reasons as above, ln(fund) in the model
was first excluded. Then, the top 5% of patent citations
were substituted by 10% when defining breakthrough
innovation. The effect of the knowledge mode variable
remained, as shown in Table 4 Models 3–4. Hence, the
result on the H2 test is robust to a satisfactory level.
Additional tests related to the hypotheses were con-
ducted. First, using Cox models, the external mode was
tested for its association with a higher rate of break-
through innovation. The hypothesis is supported, but only
for the first breakthrough innovation (b521.44, p< .05).
The finding is consistent with and adds to the original
findings in testing H1. Second, H2 was tested using Probit
models instead of Cox models. Again, the result remained
(b521.92, p< .05). This suggests that the external
mode will give firms a higher chance of reaching the
milestone of product innovation, which is consistent with
and adds to the original finding in testing H2.
Endogeneity is a potential concern in this study
because the firm’s choice of knowledge development
mode may be influenced by some variables that also
affect firm innovation outcomes. Most of the obvious
variables that may cause endogeneity were controlled
for, such as firm funds, employee size, number of alli-
ance partners, and type of technologies. The potential
endogeneity issue caused by missing variables is further
minimized with a panel data set (Semykina and Wool-
dridge, 2010). The knowledge development mode repre-
sents a managerial attitude to knowledge development
that occurs before founding and is not often changed.
The interviews carried out as part of this study sug-
gested that such changes occur when a firm hits a crisis
and needs a fundamental change of direction. These
issues are touched on in more detail in the next section.
Discussion
In answer to the call that authors should study the
coordination mechanisms, models, and approaches that




Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Listing 1.152 0.0639 20.655 0.700
(1.275) (1.454) (1.321) (1.389)
VC backing 0.699 0.685 21.037 1.630
(1.563) (1.965) (2.303) (1.506)
Ln (funds) 20.882 21.681* 21.786**
(0.765) (0.953) (0.890)
Ln (employees) 0.0705 2.057 0.993 1.910
(0.451) (1.318) (0.827) (1.228)
Alliances 20.121 20.123 20.191 20.113
(0.369) (0.368) (0.371) (0.364)
Therapeutic categories 20.737 20.656 21.269 20.406
(0.848) (1.002) (1.437) (0.702)
Technology type 1.192 1.449 0.712 1.181
(1.235) (1.749) (1.396) (1.561)
Knowledge development mode 23.854** 22.916* 23.550**
(external50; internal51) (1.808) (1.536) (1.800)
N 71 71 76 77
chi-square 4.747 11.20 8.303 13.60
df 7 8 7 8
Log likelihood 223.03 219.81 221.54 222.12
Pseudo R2 0.0934 0.220 0.162 0.235
Coefficients are reported, and standard errors are in parentheses.
** p< .05, * p< .1.
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are most effective at producing breakthrough innova-
tions, this study identified two different firm knowl-
edge development modes used by technology-based
new firms (TBNFs): internally versus externally
focused knowledge development. These two modes are
organized differently to meet the prerequisites for
achieving a breakthrough, i.e., assembling distant and
diverse knowledge and undertaking deep-dives (Kaplan
and Vakili, 2015; Phene et al., 2006). The approaches
differ in loci of creativity, how they organize knowl-
edge assembly and subsequent development, and how
they deal with path dependence. For the internal
mode, the locus of creativity is inside the firm, and
knowledge assembly often requires moving knowledge
from outside the firm to inside and developing it inter-
nally. This mode is associated with a strong onset of
path-dependence. In contrast, with the external mode,
the locus of creativity is in the network, and knowl-
edge assembly does not require knowledge transfer—
to the contrary, almost all development is by partners.
This frees the firm from strong path-dependence ten-
dencies. And in terms of resources, the external mode
is far more flexible, because it utilizes the resources of
others rather than assembling its own.
The two modes of knowledge development, as
explained in the paper, are essentially mutually exclu-
sive when applied to small firms. The setting of
TBNFs in the highly creative UK biotechnology drug
industry is used to show how these two development
modes mapped onto the likelihood of breakthrough
innovations and subsequent product development.
Even though the total population of TBNFs is small in
this setting, there appears to be strong evidence that
the external mode was associated with more break-
through innovations and speedier development of prod-
ucts to market. The statistical analysis suggests that
firms with an external mode are more productive in
achieving breakthrough innovations compared to firms
with an internal mode. In addition, adopting the exter-
nal mode will speed up the process of achieving the
subsequent product innovation milestone.
For the internal mode, the creative tension neces-
sary for breakthrough innovation rests primarily on in-
house multi-disciplinary R&D teams with gaps being
filled through alliances. However, the relatively
quicker onset of path dependence is tempered some-
what with the ability of the internal mode to achieve
the requisite variation necessary for greater break-
through productivity, at least relative to the external
mode, which on balance proves to be more adept
because of its flexible access to knowledge.
Additionally, the difficulty of assembling multi-
disciplinary in-house capabilities and building alliances
simultaneously proves to be a relatively greater chal-
lenge that impedes progress for an internal mode firm
(e.g., Sapienza et al., 2006).
The results also show that the external mode is not
necessarily impeded by its inability to undertake deep-
dives—an obvious advantage the internal mode has.
By playing an integrative role in a network of partners
that provide specialist services limited to specific parts
of a value chain, the external mode is able to tap into
and access external knowledge. Sufficient motivation
for partners can be mustered, ranging from financial,
i.e., providing services for a fee, to strategic, where
partners view their involvement as an option on devel-
oping new technology that may be of future value.
The external mode as a focal firm plays a key integral
role that is responsible for the vision, building, devel-
oping, and managing of the network. Additionally,
partners find value in the ability of the focal firm to
share knowledge from across the network or as a prof-
itable use of knowledge that they already have but is
not fully utilized.
Theoretical Implications
This study offers important theoretical implications
regarding the understanding of how TBNFs organize for
breakthrough innovation. First, as emphasized in the spe-
cial issue call, the innovation literature generally consid-
ers start-ups as the natural engines of breakthroughs
because of their creativity and lack of organizational
inertia. This study shows that the loci of creativity in
start-ups is actually varied and is linked to how the firm
is organized. The loci of creativity can either be firmly
within the firm or in its network, depending on the orga-
nizing approach. Moreover, the approaches have differ-
ent underlying assumptions and models, particularly the
learning approach in the alliances formed (e.g., Grant
and Baden-Fuller, 2004; Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005,
2010). More specifically, each mode is associated with a
different approach by which firms can identify distant
knowledge, organize subsequent deep-dives into the
assembled knowledge, and arrange the subsequent codi-
fication and exploitation of that knowledge to yield
potentially breakthrough results (e.g., Brusoni, Prencipe,
and Pavitt, 2001; Padgett and Powell, 2003; Powell
et al., 1996; Prencipe, 1997; Rothaermel and Deeds,
2004).
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This study extends innovation literature that has
hitherto focused on highlighting specific ways in
which firms involve external actors in developing
their knowledge to foster innovations (e.g., Ches-
brough, 2003, 2006). For example, Fey and Birkin-
shaw (2005) examine R&D collaborations generally,
whereas Grimpe and Kaiser (2010) and Laursen and
Salter (2006) look specifically at the role of in-
licensing and acquisition of R&D services. This
paper’s contribution is uniquely about the different
ways in which networks are used by start-ups. In the
internal mode, networks are used to either spur inter-
nal efforts and to fill gaps, whereas in the external
mode, networks are used for both exploration and
exploitation. There is a parallel between the external
development mode and the way individual scientists
(or small groups of scientists) increasingly use col-
laborations embedded in networks. Stephan (2012)
notes that investigators that have a greater external
focus can move away from safe, easily fundable
projects to less easily fundable ones but with uncer-
tain but potentially path-breaking outcomes. Whilst it
may be difficult to infer organizational principles dis-
cussed at the level of the firm to those for individuals
or small groups of investigators, both can benefit
from the same principles.
Second, there is need to re-evaluate the traditional
literature concerning the connection between absorp-
tive capacity and innovation. Absorptive capacity is
normally associated with the firm’s ability to form
effective alliances, absorb knowledge from outside the
firm, and subsequently produce innovations internally
(e.g., Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Kaplan and Vakili,
2015; Phene et al., 2006). This work suggests that a
TBNF can take an external approach and can utilize
the search capabilities and absorptive capacity of part-
ners when undertaking fundamental research and that
it is partners that can undertake the deep-dives associ-
ated with breakthrough (Weisberg, 1999). External
development approaches do not contradict traditional
notions—they reflect how they may be stretched to
emphasize different innovation outcomes. This is a
topic ripe for further research.
Third, this study suggests that choosing between
different knowledge-development modes is, in effect, a
choice between different risk paths and approaches to
option building (McGrath and MacMillan, 2000).
External knowledge modes seem to be less shackled
by path dependence and use their inherent flexibility
to source knowledge more widely (e.g., Schilling and
Steensma, 2001) and at the same time use partners to
achieve necessary deep-dives. This means that innova-
tion outcomes for the external mode are more likely to
be breakthrough and reach the market more speedily.
Seeing these two paths as a choice between mean-
enhancing innovations versus those that encourage
variance-enhancing outcomes (in particular break-
throughs) also goes some way towards answering the
questions raised by Carayannopoulos and Auster (2010)
and Taylor and Greve (2006). Also, hints are given of
how traditional concerns of agency costs in the external
mode may arise from opportunism or lack of control
(Chesbrough and Teece, 1996) can be overcome. Care-
ful strategies to mitigate these risks include disclosure
strategies (Katila et al., 2008) or the right incentives
(Owen-Smith et al., 2002; Powell et al., 1996).
Fourth, this study contributes to the emerging litera-
ture on business models that labels different activity
systems and governance arrangements between the firm
and external actors as different business models (see,
for instance, Amit and Zott, 2001; Zott and Amit,
2010). Past empirical work has only looked at the effect
of different business model arrangements on profitabil-
ity outcomes, whereas this study extends the work to
breakthrough innovation. Moreover, this investigation
suggests that these business model types can be tied up
to different sets of managerial processes, in line with
emergent thinking about business models as cognitive
types (see, for instance, Baden-Fuller and Haefliger,
2013; Baden-Fuller and Morgan, 2010).
Managerial implications. This study sheds light on
a current challenge of the biotechnology industry, with
important implications for policy makers and managers
about the value of small firm–large firm (and public–
private) collaborations that are central in the networks
of the externally organized firms. Recent reviews have
noted that there has been a relative dearth of break-
throughs in biotech for the level of investment that has
been poured into the sector (Owen and Hopkins, 2016;
Pisano, 2006). Pisano, in particular, highlights the
challenges faced by conventional organizations. This
research suggests that the external knowledge mode,
as an organizational arrangement, may be a way for-
ward. It achieves a different (and arguably better) bal-
ance between the tension of searching widely for
external and distant knowledge (Kaplan and Vakili,
2015) and the capacity to undertake deep-dives (Weis-
berg, 1999), two prerequisites that have been
highlighted in the innovation literature as necessary
for achieving breakthroughs.
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This research also hints that the external mode may
also be resource efficient. This suggests that managers
of TBNFs should seriously consider the external mode
if they value speedy product development that exploits
breakthrough innovations. However, something that
was not investigated in this paper is that the long-term
effectiveness of the external mode depends on the
availability of external partners. The interviews in this
study suggested that government-sponsored laborato-
ries that operate either within universities or are
located within big charities, such as Welcome Trust,
are important potential partners. This means that pub-
lic policy has a potentially important role in fostering
external knowledge development, with potentially
important social benefits. To be more certain, a wider
research project is needed that looks at innovation per-
formance across both large and small firms and incor-
porates the role of public laboratories in multiple
contexts to fully understand the determinants of break-
through innovations and the barriers to their exploita-
tion (Narin, Kimberly, and Olivastro, 1997).
Limitations and Future Research
One of the major limitations of this study is that the
antecedents to the knowledge development mode
choices were not explored, which is constrained by the
scope of our study. Indeed interviews in this study
suggest that the choice of the modes reflect a differ-
ence in orientation of founders, but this leaves open
the question of how these orientations come about.
Future studies will need to model the firms’ choice of
knowledge development modes directly. As mentioned
before, endogeneity is a potential concern because the
firm’s choice of knowledge development mode might
be influenced by variables that also affect firm innova-
tion outcomes. Endogeneity concerns were minimized
by controlling for most of the obvious variables that
may cause endogeneity and by using a panel data set.
A future study on the antecedents to the knowledge
development mode choice is the only way to truly
unpack the endogeneity concern and obtain more-
robust conclusions.
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